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 CANNING AND SPANISH AMERICA
 BY COLONEL E. M. LLOYD, R. E.
 Read December I 7, I903
 IN a letter to Hookham Frere, on January 8, I825, Canning
 spoke of the recognition of Mexico and Colombia as ' an act
 which will make a change ill the face of the world almost as
 great as that of the discovery of the continent now set free.
 The Allies will fret; but they will venture no serious
 remonstrance. France will fidget; but it will be with a
 view of hastening after our example. The Yankees will
 shout in triumph; but it is they who lose most by our
 decision.
 ' The great danger of the time a danger which the
 policy of the European system would have fostered-was a
 division of the world into European and American, Re-
 publican and Monarchical; a league of worn-out govern-
 ments on the one hand, and of youthful and stirring nations,
 with the United States at their head) in the other. We slip
 in between, and plant ourselves in Mexico. The United
 States have gotten the start of us in vain; and we link once
 more America to Europe. X 1
 Stapleton, Canning's secretary and biographer, speaks of
 the recognition as perhaps the most important measure
 adopted while Canning was Foreign Minister.2 The steps by
 which it was brought about well deserve study, and illustrate
 the merits and demerits of orators as statesmen.
 l Festing, J. H. Erere and his Friends, p. 267.
 2 PoSitical Life of Canning, ii. I.
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 Canning had been a personal friend of Queen Caroline,
 and it was on account of the difficulties in connexion with
 her that he had left office at the end of I820. In doing
 so he had assured Lord Liverpool and his colleagues that it
 was a deep mortification to him ' that one unfortunate question
 should, from circumstances over which he has no control,
 prevent him at a moment like the present from continuing
 to take his full share in upholding, in conjunction with theme
 those general principles of policy, internal and external, upon
 which they have been acting cordially together.' Castlereagh
 in his reply referred to ' the unanimity of sentiment which
 has prevailed in the Cabinet upon our general policy, internal
 and external,' and spoke of himself as 'the individual
 member of the Government who must feel your loss the most
 seriously, both in the House of Commons and in the business
 of the Foreign Office.' 1
 On Castlereagh's death (August t822) Canning was
 regarded, especially by Lord Liverpool, as the only man
 who could succeed him as leader of the House of Commons.
 It was doubtful whether he would accept any other office
 than that of Foreign Secretary; and besides, as Wellington
 put it, ' nothing can be so erroneous as to place any
 individual of great activity and talents in a situation in which
 there is no scope for his activity, and in which he must fee}
 that his talents are thrown away.' 2 It was decided, therefore,
 to oSer Canning the full succession; and in overcoming the
 king's personal objections Wellington declared his conviction
 that Canning's principles and opinions ' are in all the main
 points of your Majesty's policy, domestic as well as foreign,
 the same as those of your other servants.' 3
 Nevertheless there was a widespread feeling that the
 change meant a new departure. Two members of the
 Cabinet, Eldon and Sidmouth, had been strongly opposed to
 it. Castlereagh's brother resigned the embassy at Vienna.
 John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State at SVashington,
 ' Stapleton, George Ca>tningand his Eimes, pp. 3I6, 3I9.
 2 [iVeZZington ]:)espatches, Third Series i. 277. s fibid. p. 274
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 questioned Stratford Canning about his cousin's personal
 disposition ' with an evident leaning to the idea that George
 Canning's accession to office is likely to introduce a more
 liberal and vigorous sys$em into the Cabinet.' 1
 Canning was in favour of the Catholic claims, but so was
 Castlereagh; Castlereagh was against Parliamentary Reform}
 but so was Canning. The d;fference between them was not
 one of principles but of character. Castlereagh was a bad
 speaker, but a man of sound judgment, cool and courageous,
 who combined suavity with strength. He had spent his life
 in fighting Revolution, and he had learnt to place a high
 lralue on Continental alliances, especially that of Austria, not
 only in dealing with Napoleon, the embodiment of the
 Revolution, but also in dealing with the Czar. In the seven
 years that followed Waterloo, British tendencies and those of
 the Continental Powers drifted apart, and Castlereagh in-
 curred unpopularity on both sides by his eSorts to keep
 them together.
 Canning was justly described by Sir James Mackintosh
 (his political opponent) as ' a man of fine and brilliant genius,
 of warm aXections, of high and generousE spirit ;' but he
 looked at affairs with ' the excitable disposition of the poet
 and the orator,' 2 and he had the orator's craving for popular
 applause. As Gladstone said of Peel, he was ' very sensible
 of the sweetness of the cheers of opponents.' Among men of
 his own party he had won 'a character for intrigue and
 insincerity.' 3 The high hopes of his earlier years had been
 blighted by his own mistakes, and he had been obliged to
 accept as his leader the man whom he had once tried to get
 rid of as an inefficient colleague. He was now past fifty and
 his health was far from robust. A few weeks after his
 appointment as Foreign Secretary he wrote to a friend:
 4 Ten years have made a world of difference, and prepared a
 very different sort of world to bustle in than that which
 ' Poole, Life of I,ord Stratford de Rcdc!.iffie, i. 3 IO.
 2 Sir 1:I. Bulwer, Eistorical Characters, p. 4I8.
 3 Croker, Diar?es, i. 267.
 6 *
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 I should have found in I8I2. For fame, it is a squeezed
 orange; but for public good there is something to do, and
 I will try but it must be cautiously to do it. You know
 my politics well enough to know what I mean when I say
 that for Esgrope I shall be desirous noqv and: then to read
 i:ngland.' l
 What he meant was indicated in his speech to his
 Liverpool constituents on August 30, before he had been
 invited to rejoin the Ministry: ' In the times in which we live
 there is (disguise it how we may) a struggle going on-in
 some countries an open, in some a tacit struggle-between
 the principles of monarchy and democracy. God be praised
 that in that struggle we have not any part to take. . . . Eng-
 land has only to maintain herself on the basis of her own
 solid and settled constitution, firm, unshaken a spectator
 interested in the contest only by her sympathies; not a partisan
 on either side, but, for the sake of both, a model, and ultimately
 perhaps an umpire.' 2 SO far as England was concerned, there
 was no longer need for leagues of governments against the
 Revolution. Things were 'getting back to a wholesome state
 again. Every nation for itself, and God for us all*' 3
 ' He was a Briton} through and through; British in his
 feelingss British in his aims, British in all his policy and
 projects': such was the impression he made on Rush, the
 American minister, who praised the candid and liberal spirit
 in which Castlereagh always regarded American affdirs.4
 - A year after Canning took office he explained himself as
 follows to the British ambassador at Vienna (Sir Henry
 Wellesley): ' The Austrian minister prides himself, you say,
 upon being the champion and protector of ancient institutions,
 and the sworn irreconcilable enemy of revolution. I flatter
 myself that I am no more a lover of revolution than Prince
 Metternich. I have certainly passed near thirty years in
 fighting for old institlltions, in that House of Commons
 l Stapleton, George Ca7%ning and his Tames, p. 364. 2 Sbid. p. 368.
 3 Ibid. p. 370
 4 Rush, The Cod of London fror; I8I9 to I825, p. 358.
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 which Prince Metternich views with so much jealousy; but
 in which and by which, after all, revolution has been arrested,
 and what remains of old institutions has been saved. But
 I cannot- shut my eyes to the real state of things. I cannot
 forget, nor should Prince Metternich, that in resisting the
 French Revolution in all its stages, from the Convention to
 Buonaparte, we resisted the spirit of change to be sure, but we
 resisted also the spirit of foreign domination. So long as
 these two spirits were leagued, the resistance to one animated
 that to the other. But separate them, or (still more) array
 them against each other, and the most strenuous and most
 consistent anti-revolutionist may well hesitate which part to
 choose.' 1
 He showed that this was no new attitude for an English
 statesman. He referred to Castlereagh's declarations in I 820,
 in the confidential memorandum respecting Spain, and in the
 reply to the Troppau circular. Both of these were protests
 against the collective interference of the Powers in the aSairs
 of other States. But in reply to Metternich's warning that
 England was losing her influence in Europe by separating
 herself from the Continental powers, he asked what had that
 influence eSected at Laybach or Verona. ' No-our influence,
 if it is to be maintained abroad, must be secure in the sources
 of our strength at home; and the sources of that strength are
 in the sympathy between the people and the government; in
 the union of public sentiment with the public counsels; in
 the reciprocal confidence and co-operation of the House of
 Commons and the Crown.' 2
 In a similar strain he had told his constituents at Liver-
 pool in I8I6, in reply to the charge that he was a political
 adventurer: ' If to depend directly upon thedpeople, as their
 representative in Parliament; if, as a servant of the Crown,
 to lean on no other support than that of public confidence-
 if that be to be an adventurer, I plead guilty to the charge.' 3
 One of the questions which interested the people of
 Stapleton, George Canrsig and his Times, p. 380.
 2 Zbid. pp. 375, 378 s Martineau, Eistory of the Peace, i. 437.
 N .S .-VOL. XVIII . G
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 England, especially a commercial community like Liverpool,
 was the emancipation of South America. The revolt of the
 Spanish colonies had opened the door to British trade at a
 time when Napoleon was doing his best to close all other
 doors to it. Extravagant hopes were entertained of the
 possible development of this trade when those countries
 should become peaceful and independent States. The contest
 had lasted twelve years, and might be prolonged, but its issue
 was hardly doubtful. Buenos Ayres, Chili, Mexico, Venezuelat
 and New Granada were practically free. The two latter had
 united to form the republic of Colombia, to which the pro-
 vince of Quito had been added in May I822. It was only in
 Peru that the war continued with alternate success. In the
 work of liberation British soldiers and sailors had played an
 important part. Various corps, numbering altogether some
 5,ooo men) had been recruited in England and Ireland, largely
 from Wellington's old soldiers, and had helped Bolivar to
 rictory at Carabobo and elsewhere. Lord Cochrane had
 formed a Chilian navy, and driven the Spaniards off the
 Pacific coast. Loans of many millions sterling had been raised,
 chiefly in tne London market, to provide the sinews of war.
 The absolutist tendencies of Ferdinand quickened British
 sympathies for the revolted colonies, and the discord between
 the king and the Spanish Liberals paralysed the efforts of the
 mother country to restore her authority. Such restoration,
 followed as it was likely to be by some return to the old trade
 restrictions, would be even worse for British commerce than
 the continuance of the existing anarchy in South America.
 The cry for Parliamentary reform always grew louder in
 England in proportion as trade grew slack and taxation
 pressed heavily. A government which was opposed to re-
 form had special inducements, therefore, to open fresh
 markets or hinder the closing of them. In I790 Pitt had
 told Miranda that the emancipation of Spanish America was
 a matter which 'would infallibly engage the attention of
 every minister of this country.' 1 In I8I0 Canning had replied
 ' Martineau, i. I27.
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 to those who spoke of Talavera as a barren victory that it
 would hereafter open to us the ports of Spanish America.l
 The United Stateshad shown themselves friendly through-
 out to the colonies which were following their own example,
 and the independence of the new States had been formally
 recognised by Congress on May 4, I822. s SO, Mr. Adams,
 you are going to make honest people of them? ' said the
 British minister, Stratford Canning. ' Yes, sir,' Adams
 replied; ' we proposed to your government to join us some
 time ago, but they would not, and now we shall see whether
 you will be content to foZZow us.' 2 This step caused much
 anxiety in England, lest the new States should discriminate
 by concessions or import duties between the countries which
 had recognised them and those which had not.
 Castlereagh was to have represented Great Britain at the
 Congress of Vienna (or Verona, as it afterwards became) in
 I 822. He had drafted instructions for his own guidance
 which had been approved by the Cabinet. On his death,
 Wellington was sent as British representative, and was to be
 guided by these instructions. Canning supplemented them
 as regards the Eastern question, but not as regards the aSairs
 of Spain or Spanish America.
 In the case of Spain, rigid abstinence from any inter-
 ference in her internal affairs formed the basis of British
 policy, coupled with solicitude for the safety of the royal
 family, and observance of our engagements with Portugal.
 In the case of the Spanish colonies in revolt, it was laid down
 that where the contest still subsisted there was no justifiable
 ground for recognition. But in the larger number of pro-
 vinces the struggle might be said to be over, the local govern-
 ments had complete possession, and there was already a de
 facto recognition of them. The question was how long
 should the de facro system of recognition be maintained, to
 the exclusion of a more formal recognition by diplomatic
 agents, not amounting to a recognition deyure ?
 1 Stapleton, George Cannizg and his 7siznes, p. I SS.
 2 Poole, Eife of Iord StraZfood de Redsliffie, i. 3IO.
 G 2
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 Wellington was to discuss this question with the allielal
 Courts. He was to ' recall to their attention the intercourse
 which for a long period of years has subsisted between
 Great Britain and the provinces so circumstanced, and the
 impossibility of its now being obstructed or checked without
 the certainty of rousing the utmost spirit of discontent in the
 commercial world; that the British Parliament in its last
 session has found it necessary to give to that intercourse a
 character of reciprocity, and to relax in its favour the former
 principle of our Navigation Act, viz. the exclusion of the
 produce of South America except in British ships.' He was
 to endeavour, as far as possible, to bring the Allied cabinets
 to the adoption of common sentiments, but to take care to
 leave the British Government an independent discretion to
 act according to circumstances.l
 In November Wellington circulated a note drawn up in
 accordance with these instructions. He mentioned in it (at
 Canning's suggestion) that the relaxation of the authority of
 Spain in America had let loose a multitude of pirates and
 buccaneers which disturbed British trade and insulted the
 British flag. As redress could not be obtained from Spaine
 the British Government was driven to undertake the task ;-
 ' but it is impossible to expect that this intolerable evil should
 be thoroughly extirpated without the co-operation of the
 local authorities occupying the ports and coasts of that
 part of the continent of America. The necessity of this
 co-operation must lead to some further recognition of the-
 existence de facto of some one or more of these self-erected
 governments.' 2 The question, however, received little atten--
 tion at the Congress, and no agreement was arrived at.
 In the following session of Parliament, Canning was con-
 gratulated by the members of the Opposition on the British
 attitude at Verona, but he very properly disclaimed any
 special credit for it. s He was compelled in mere justice to
 say that upon his entering into the office vshich he had the
 honour to fill, he found the principles on which the govern-
 l W6lli1tt0Zt Despatskes, i. 287. 2 Abid. p. 386.
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 ment was acting reduced to writing; and this State paper
 formed what he might be allowed to call the political creed
 of the ministers.' 1
 Nevertheless the question of Spanish America was one
 into which he threw himself with ardour. He wrote to
 Wellington on October 29: ' Is it possible to stop the pro-
 gress of events and to soothe the growing impatience of our
 whole mercantile and manufacturing interests standing still
 and doing nothing ? ' And again on November 8: ' Every day
 convinces me more and more that in the present state of the
 world, in the present state of the Peninsula, and in the
 present state of this country, the American questions are out
 of all proportion more important to us than the European,
 and that if we do not seize and turn them to our advantage
 in time, we shall rue the loss of an opportunity, nerrer, never
 to be recovered.' 2
 Wellington, on the other hand, was altogether in favour of
 delay. ' I know,' he said (October I 8), ' that we must at last
 recognise all these governments, but I would recognise them
 when necessary, and only when really constituted and become
 powers; instead of seeking for reasons for recognising them,
 and by recognising them, constitute them.' Again (No-
 vember IO): ' I have always been for going as far as was
 necessary and never further, and for justifying to Spain and
 the Allies each particuIar case. By so doing, we shall stand
 as we ought to do in the eyes of the world. If we go further,
 we shall lose our character for justice and forbearance, which
 after all is what constitutes our power.'
 He found reasons for such forbearance in our connexion
 with Spain and with the Colonies, and in the assistance which
 British subjects had given to the latter. He added: ' I con-
 fess that I should be ashamed of showing my face even upon
 the present occasion, if the piracy did not give me something
 to say besides the argument of commercial advantage and
 the clamours of our people.' 3
 ' Stapleton, Political Life of Canning, i. 299.
 2 WelZington Despatches, i. 466 and 5 t I.  3 ffibid. i. 385 and 5I6.
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 He had always diXered from his colleagues about the
 Spanish colonies in America. He thought that measures
 should have been taken earlier to prevent the interference of
 British subjects in the war, and disapproved every step
 towards recognition. He wrote to Metternich (May 4, I 824) .
 ' I am one of those who think that it will be very little diXer-
 ence to this country in what way the disputes between thee
 Colonies and the Mother Country are terminated, provided
 foreign powers do not interfere: but that is not the general
 opinion in this country.' 1
 To protect British trade, consuls were sent to the several
 provinces. Fresh remonstrances and warnings were addressed
 to Madrid, respecting piracy in the West Indies and the un-
 just condemnation of British vessels by Spanish courts for-
 trading with the revolted colonies. Orders were given to our
 naval officers in those seas to make reprisals. The Spanish
 Government promised full redress, but it was in no position
 to make it. It had enough to attend to at home
 Wellington had failed both at Verona and at Paris to
 persuade the Continental powers to adopt a policy of non-
 intervention in Spain. In April I823 a French army,the
 instrument of the Holy Alliance, invaded Spain to liberate
 the king from the control of the Constitutional party. By
 the end of September Cadiz was taken, Ferdinand was set
 free, and at once proceeded to crush the Constitutionals.
 Canning was very indignant at the invasion, and was disposed
 to back up his remonstrances by demonstrations, which he
 was afterwards assured by the French premier, Villele, would
 have sufficed to prevent it ;2 but he was overruled by the
 Cabinet.
 Villele was personally against invasion. He was much
 more concerned about Spanish America, and he wished to
 obtain influence rather than domination in Spain, to further
 French commercial interests. He feared that war would
 play into the hands of England. He had even offered, irs
 WelEington DespagcAes, ii. 388 and 260.
 2 Stapleton, George Canning and hwis 7simes, p. 55 I.
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 I822, to convey Spanish troops to the Spanish colonies.
 This led Canning to intimate to the French Government
 when the French army was about to cross the Spanish
 frontier, that, ' disclaiming in the most solemn manner any in-
 tention of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the
 late Spanish possessions in America, His Majesty is satisfied
 that no attempt will be made by France to bring under her
 dominion any of those possessions, either by conquest or by
 cession from Spain.' 2
 No answer was returned to this despatch, and before long
 there were rumours that France meant to help Ferdinand to
 recover his colonies, and was to be indemnified in America
 for the expenses she had incurred in Spain. There was no
 difference of opinion among our ministers as to British action in
 such a contingency. In a cabinet memorandum, written before
 the French invasion, Lord Liverpool had advocated neutrality,
 but had pointed out that the case would be altered if France
 should attempt to lend Spain aid in America ' Here a
 maritime war would be to the purpose, and I should have no
 difficulty in deciding that we ought to prevent, by every
 means in our power, perhaps Spairl from sending a single
 Spanish regiment to South America, after the supposed ter-
 mination of the war in Spain, but certainly France from
 affording to Spain any aid or assistance for that purpose.' 3
 Wellington, while disbelieving that France entertained
 any intention of interfering in the Spanish-American con-
 cerns, was quite prepared to veto such interference. He
 thought, however, that ' it would be far more conciliatory and
 more effectual for every purpose, excepting to gratify those
 who wish to push us to a quarrel, to communicate verbally
 either with M. de Polignac [the French ambassador] or with
 the ministers at Paris, and if there be real ground for un-
 easiness, explain it to them arld call for an explanation of
 their conduct.'4 Canning adopted this course, and had a
 ' Wellington Despatches, i. 640.
 2 Stapleton, PoSiticaS l:ife of Canning, ii. I9.
 3 Yonge's Liverpool, ii. 232-3. 4 Wellington Despatchcs, ii. I35.
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 conversation with Polignac on October 9, in which he told
 him that the British Government could not see any part of
 the Sparlish colonies transferred to any other power with
 indifference, and that it would consider any foreign inter-
 ference, by force or by menace, in the dispute between Spain
 and the colonies, as a motive for recognising the latter
 without delay. Polignac replied that his government re-
 garded the reduction of Spanish America as utterly hopeless,
 and had no intention or desire to appropriate any part of it.l
 Some time before this (on August 20) Canning had pro-
 posed to Rush, the United States minister, a joint declara-
 tion by Great Britain and the United States, that they did
 not aim at the possession of any portion of the Spanish
 colonies themselves and could not see any part of them
 transferred to any other power with indifference. Rush re-
 ported this overture to Washington, but oXered to take the
 responsibility of agreeing to it if Great Britain would re-
 cognise the Spanish-American States. That was more than
 Canning could promise, and the matter dropped.2
 At Washington it was decided that (in J. 52. Adams's
 words) ' it would be more candid, as well as more dignified,
 to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France, than
 to come in as a cockboat in the wake of the British man-of
 war.' The avowal was made in the President's message to
 Congress on December 2, which developed what has since been
 known as the Monroe doctrine. ' With the existing colonies
 or dependencies of any European power, we have not
 interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments
 who have declared their independence and maintained it, and
 whose independence we have on great consideration and on
 just principles acknowledged, we could not view- any inter-
 position for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in
 any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in
 any other light than as the manifestation of an un-friendly
 1 Stapleton, PoZitical tife of Canning, ii. 26.
 2 Rush, She Cozgr! of London from I8I9 to I825, p. 376.
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 xdisposition towards the United States.' So ran the- part of
 the message which had reference to this particular question.1
 The declaration was hailed by Brougham as decisive for
 South American independence. And Canning himself wrote
 (December 3I): ' They have aided us materially. The
 Congress was broken in all its limbs before, but the
 President's speech gives it the cout de grace.' 2 But taking the
 Monroe doctrine as a whole, it does not seem that Mr. Bayard
 was warranted in speaking of it (in I887) as announced at
 the instance and with the moral support and approval of the
 British Government.
 The fact is, there was too much rivalry between the two
 governments for cordial co-operation. Take, for instance, the
 question of Cuba. While Wellington was at Verona, Canning
 wrote to him (November 8, I822): ' I hope I may not have
 to tell you, before your return, that the Yankees have occupied
 Cuba; a blow which I do not know how we can prevent,
 but which as a government I hardly know how we should
 survive, if we do nothing to compensate it to ourselves.'
 Wellington's reply was: ' In general I chould say that the
 American example is one to be avoided rather than followed;
 and I am not certain that I would not prefer to forbid them
 to take Cuba than to follow their example by taking Puerto
 Rico.' 3
 The question continued to weigh on Canning's mind, and
 in May I824 he went so far as to oSer to enter into a
 formal engagement with Spain that the British navy should
 defend Cuba against any externaS aggression, if Spain would
 recognise the independence of the revolted colonies.4 Happily
 the offer was declined. In February I825 Polignac reported
 to his government that Canning was said to harre been trying
 to buy Cuba, and would rather see France acquire it than the
 United States.5
 1 Foster, A Centgry of Aznerican Diplomacy, p. 442-450. Cf. Mr. W. C.
 Ford's articles on J. Q. Adams and the Monroe doctrine, in the American
 ZisZorisaS Review, July and October I902.
 2 Stapleton, George Canning and has Simes, p. 395.
 3 WeZZington Despazches, i. 5 I I, 545.
 4 Stapleton, PoliticaS Life of Canning, ii. 55. 5 Villele Memoires, v. I60.
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 There was no less jealousy at Washington lest France or
 England should get possession of the island. The American
 minister at Madrid was told (April 28, I823) to let it be
 known ' that we should consider an attempt to transfer the
 island, against the will of its inhabitants, as subversive of their
 rights, no less than of our interests.' Rush represented
 Canning's overture as prompted wholly by British interests:
 ' It is France that must not be aggrandised, not South
 America that must be made free.' Adams wrote: 'The
 object of Canning appears to have been to obtain some public
 pledge from the Government of the United States, ostensibly
 against the forcible interference of the Holy Alliance between
 Spain and South America, but really or especially against the
 acquisition to the United States themselves of any part of the
 Spanish-American possessions.' 1
 The Congress to which Canning referred in the letter
 above quoted as 'broken in all its limbs' was to be held at
 Paris, ' to aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of the revolted
 colonies in America.' It was meant to restrain England from
 recognition, and perhaps to secure a European mandate for
 French intervention. The proposal was put forward by the
 King of Spain, but it originated vuith Russia. The British
 Government declined to take part in it, and practically nothing
 came of it. Wellington told the Russian ambassador frankly
 ' that we were the only power which had any influence in this
 question, and that they had no right to call upon us to go
 into a conference to decide in what manner that influence
 should be exerted, when it was well known that over the
 decisions of that conference we should have no influence
 whatever.' 2
 In acquainting the Spanish minister with the decision of
 the British Government on this point, Canning had informed
 him (in January I824) that it had no wish to anticipate Spain
 in the recognition of the South American States, and would
 ' W. C. Ford, 'John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine,' Americag
 Bistorical A2eview, vii. 680.
 2 Wellington Despatches, ii. I90.
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 willingly aid Spain in a negotiation on the basis of inde-
 pendence; but that before many months ' considerations
 regarding not only the essential interests of His Majesty's
 subjects, but the relations of the Old World with the New,'
 might forbid any further postponement in the case of those
 States which had established defacto their political existence.
 In March papers were presented to Parliament which made
 all the world acquainted with this notification, and also with
 Canning's conlrersation with Polignac in the previous October.
 This, as Canning afterwards remarked, ' sealed the fate of the
 question.' 1
 The Spanish ministers sought to gain time by assurances
 that British interests were in no danger; but the considera-
 tions to which Canning had pointed hastened matters. In
 July he proposed that recognition should be given to Buenos
 Ayres and Colombia by negotiating commercial treaties with
 them. Wellington and other members of the Cabinet opposed
 this step, and urged that while Bolivar with the Colombian
 army was fighting in Peru, and the result was doubtful,
 Colombia itself could not be regarded as securely established.
 It was decided, therefore, to wait for the reports of commis-
 sioners who had been sent to Mexico and Colombia, and to
 recognise at present only Buenos Ayres, which had a settled
 government, and had long been free from Spanish troops.
 Full powers were sent to the British consul to negotiate a
 treaty, but the step was kept secret. At this very time in
 fact Villele was writing to Polignac that in the actual state
 of the Spanish colonies recognition would bring discredit
 without benefit, and that the English Gonrernment was too
 enlightened to do such a thing.2
 The victory of Ayacucho (December 9, I824) decided the
 fate of Peru, and practically ended the War of Independence.
 But before the news of it reached England further steps
 towards recognition had been taken. In a ' memorandum
 X Stapleton, George Canning and his Eiwaes, p. ,o3.
 2 \'illele, M#moires, v. 92.
 7
This content downloaded from 129.219.247.33 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 02:29:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 92 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY
 on our relations with the Spanish American Provinces,' 1 cir-
 clllated among the Cabinet at the end of November, it was
 pointed out that these States could, if they chose, force recog-
 nition by putting high duties on imports from non-recognising
 powers. If this were done, the result would be to throw the
 wealth, power, and influence of those countries into the hands
 of the people of the United States. It would be better,
 therefore, to recognise them before it became evident that we
 were doing it under compulsion.
 Wellington still maintained that ' in a view to our own
 internal situation,2 to our relations with foreign powers, to
 our former and to our existing relations with Spain, con-
 sidering the mode in which the contests with these States had
 been carried on, and to our own honour and good name, the
 longer the establishment of such relations is delayed the
 better.'3 But after long discussions it was decided that
 commercial treaties should be negotiated with Mexico and
 Colombia as had been done with Buenos Ayres.
 The king reluctantly assented (December I 7), and in
 doing so he said: 'The king wishes that these Ineasures
 should stand on the ground of the interests of his subjects,
 and not as measures of war or retaliation against other
 powers; and that they should not be put forth to the world
 as having any other objects in view than those which the
 king has stated as his motive for assenting to them.' 4 In
 submitting the matter to him Canning had laid great stress
 on the indefinite military occupation of Cadiz and other
 Spanish fortresses by France. Spain, he argued, could no
 longer be considered as a free agent; her foreign policy VtraS
 ' This is attributed to Lord Liverpool in Yonge's life of him (ii. 297), and
 also in Canning's letter to the king (George Canniwgg, p. 407); but Canning's
 note of November 30 to Wellington implies that he was himself the writer
 ( Welline>tan SDespaMckes, ii. 354).
 2 He wrote to Peel (December 30): ' We are going to bring the rebel Bolivar
 and the rebel State of Colombia into diplomatic relations with His Majesty at the
 very moment in which we prosecute Mr. O'Connell for holding them up as an
 example to the people of Ireland ' (bid. p. 385).
 3 Abp 364- 4 Abid. p. 368.
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 essentially French; and it became the duty of the British
 Government to prevent Spanish America from being brought
 within the same subjection.1
 A week before, he had told Lord Granville, the ambassador
 at Paris, to ask the French ministers for a positive disavowal
 of any design of retaining Cadiz, and for a fixed term for the
 evacuation of it and the other fortresses. Their answer was
 that the duration of the French occupation must depend on
 the will and pleasure of France and Spain.2 Canning was in
 fact well aware of their wish to withdraw, but the state of
 Spain made it difficuIt to fix a date.
 On December I7 Canning nvrote again to Granville: ' The
 fight has been hard, but it is won. The deed is done. The
 nail is driven. Spanish America is free; and if we do not
 mismanage our matters sadly, she is English, and 'novus
 sseclorum nascitur ordo.' . . . Now you will understand why
 I set you upon Damas and Villele for the answer about
 Spain. You see the use that it has been turned to in the
 minute. It was no less useful in discussion. We that is
 L[iverpool] and I had made up our minds to be satisfied
 with Mexico. But your despatch enabled us to carry
 Colombia too. Now that it has done its work, I do not want
 to persecute Villele w-ith this question, nor to get any Ill-
 humour into the discussion.' 3
 Lord Dalling has spoken of 'the adroit adaptations of
 means to ends, the clever profiting by times and occasions '
 which characterised Canning.4 This is an example of them.
 It certainly smacks also of the insincerity which Croker
 complained of.
 On January I, I825, Canning informed the foreign am-
 bassadors of the measures that had been taken, and they
 were announced to Parliament a month afterwards. There
 they met with general approval, the Opposition confining itself
 to criticism of the long delay in recognition, and the particular
 ' Stapleton, George Canningand his Sir/aes, p. 407-4II.
 2 bid p. ,88. 3 Zbid. p. 4I2*
 4 Bulwer, Hiszorical Chaacters, p. 43I,
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 method adopted. Russia, Austria, and Prussia expressed
 their deep regret at a step which 'gave a final blow to the
 interests of Spain in the New World, and tended to encourage
 the revolutionary spirit which it had been found so difficult
 to restrain in Europe,' but took no further action. Spain
 made a formal protest, and drew from Canning a long
 justification in which he brought forward abundant precedent
 for the recognition of de facto governments.1
 The commercial treaties were negotiated, and the envoys
 from Colombia and Buenos Ayres were received very
 graciously by George IV. before the end of the year. By
 that time the king had come to the conclusion that his fears
 of trouble with the Continental powers were groundless, and
 his dislike of Canning was changing into admiration and
 attachment. The minister did not disdain the aid of Lady
 Conyngham to win his way into the king's good graces.2
 In the autumn of I826 Canning went to Paris and had
 several conferences with Villele. Some French troops were
 still in Spain, and though Villele was eager to withdraw them,
 circumstances hindered him. New complications now arose.
 In Portugal British influence had been exerted more success-
 fully than in Spain, and had brought about a peaceful
 separation between Portugal and Brazil. On the death of
 John Vl., in March I826, his son Pedro, Emperor of Brazil,
 succeeded him, but being unwilling to leave Brazil he
 renounced the Portuguese crown in favour of his daughter,
 after granting a constitution which was brought from Rio
 to Lisbon by the British minister, Sir Charles Stuart. The
 enemies of this constitution rallied round Pedro's brother,
 Miguel, and the support given to them by the Spanish
 government brought Spain and Portugal to the brink of war.
 Portuguese deserters were allowed to recross the frontier as
 armed corps to serve as a nucleus for insurrection.
 Portugal appealed to England for the assistance which
 she was bound by treaty to furnish against external aggres-
 Stapleton, PoliticaS LiJe of Canninb, ii. 79-92.
 q Bulwer, GisgoricaS Characfers, p. 449.
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 sion. On this point there was no difference of opinion in the
 British Cabinet. On December II, I826, Canning brought
 down to the House of Commons a message from the king,
 rand next day 5,ooo men were on the way to Lisbon.
 In moving the address in reply to the king's message,
 Canning went back to the line of argument he had followed
 three years before, but with a significant change. At that
 time (April, I823) he had given it as a strong reason why
 England should not assist Spain to repel the French invasion,
 that in such a war all the weapons of insurrection would
 inevitably come into play, and it vvas not for England, which
 had so long fought against Jacobins and AnarchistsX to bring
 about this result. Her part was to hold the balance between
 conflicting principles. He nowr adverted once more to these
 consequences of a war of opinions but this time it was to
 warn foreign nations that 'this country (however earnestly
 she may endeavour to avoid it) could not, in such case, avoid
 seeing ranked under her banners all the restless and dissatis-
 fied of any nation with which she might come in conflict.' 1
 It was a line of argument not much to the taste of his
 colleagues. Wellington's comment was: ' We pass in Europe
 for a Jacobin club. However, as yet we have only boasted
 that we are such a body. Our acts do not yet prove it.' 2
 In Parliament there was no opposition worth mentioning
 to the course which the gosernment had decided on. But
 some speakers referred, by way of either praise or blame, to
 the neutrality which had been adopted when France invaded
 Spain. Canning seized the opportunity to vindicate his
 foreign policy. He owned that he had always regarded the
 French occupation of Spain as a disparagement and an
 airont to England. But ' whatever effect a war commenced
 upon the mere ground of the entry of a French army into
 Spain might have, it would probably not have had the eSect
 of getting that army out again. . * . Was there no other mode
 l Stat)leton, Political Life of Canning, iii. 223.
 2 WelEine,gon Despakhes, iii. 500.
 7 *
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 of resistance than by a direct attack upon France, or by a
 war to be undertaken on the soil of Spain ?
 ' What if the possession of Spain might be rendered harm-
 less as regards usnd valueless to the possessors; might not
 compensation for disparagement be obtained, and the policy
 of our ancestors vindicated, by means better adapted to the
 present time? If France occupied Spain, was it necessaryr
 in order to avoid the consequences of that occupation, that
 we should blockade Cadiz? No. I looked another way I
 sought materials of compensation in another hemisphere.
 Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known here
 I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain
 withw thte Indzes. I called the New World into existence to
 redress the balance of the Old.' 1
 Few phrases have been more often quoted, yet perhaps
 never was a phrase more hollow. Sir James Graham spoke
 of it as a proof of the excitement Canning had produced in
 his audience that they were ripe for such a boast.2 It was not
 Canning who had called the new States into existence; it was
 they themselves. In recognising them we followed the
 example of the United States, and did so mainly for com-
 mercial reasons. Before the French invasion of Spain
 Canning was taking steps in that direction. The one great
 service we had rendered them was in saying ' Hands off ! ' to
 France; but here also the United States must share the
 credit, and it was in no special sense Canning's work. His
 language went counter to the proviso which George IV. had
 attached to his assent to the commercial treaties, that they
 should not be put forth to the world as measures of reta-
 liation. It implied also that Canning would view with
 equanimity a permanent occupation of Spain (without the
 Indies) by France, which was very far from being the case.
 Canning knew that it had been intimated to the King of
 Spain that the French troops wollld be withdrawn in April,
 but he treated his knowledge as confidential. ' Had I felt
 ' Stapleton, Political Life of Canring, iii. 227-234.
 2 T. WIoore, Dia, p. 427.
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 myself authorised to afErm that the period of evacuation was
 fised and certain, I should have had no need of any other
 defence,' he wrote to Granville (Dec. I4). In the absence
 of such authority, ' I was obliged to justify in the best manner
 I could . . . our tame acquiescence in the continuance of the
 French army in Spain.' He owned that, personally, he could
 not regret the extremity to which he was driven: ' for if I
 know anything of the House of Commons from thirty-three
 years' experience, or if I may trust to what reaches me in
 reports of feelings out of doors, the declaration of the obvious
 but unsuspected truth that " I called the New World into
 existence to redress the balance of the Old," has been more
 grateful to English ears and to English feelings ten thousand
 times, than would have been the most satisfactory announce-
 ment of the intention of the French Government to svithdraw
 its army from Spain.' 1
 However grateful to English ears and conducive to his
 own popularity, Canning's vindication was not needed-to
 justify the sending of troops to Portugal. That was a step
 which all parties at home approved, and which Damas, the
 French Foreign Minister, defended as a compliance with
 treaty obligations. The Villele ministry had blamed the
 proceedings of Spain, and had recalled their ambassador
 Moustier, who had secretly encouraged those proceedings. It
 is true Villele stood in need of support against the ultras, who
 had the ear of Charles X., but support was furnished by the
 vigorous action of Great Britain, and Canning's language
 proved rather an embarrassment, giving a handle to ex-
 tremists.
 Regarded as a mere thetorical flourish to serve a
 momentary purpose, it would not be worth while to dwell
 upon it; but his letters already quoted show that his words
 represented a genuine conviction. Carried away by a lively
 imagination, he did not see facts in a dry light. He exagge-
 rated the value of the work done, and his own share in the
 doing of it. As regards the former, the new American
 1 Stapleton, George Canning and Ais Simes, p. 546.
 N.S.- VOL. XVIII. H
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 States were a broken reed to lean upon, to redress the
 European balance. They had no sooner left off fighting the
 Spaniards than they began to fight among themselves.
 Their republican constitutions were superseded by military
 dictatorships, and their federations were dissolved.l Six
 years after our recognition of them the trade of Great
 Britain (imports and exports) with La Plata, Mexico, and
 Colombia was under three millions, only one fourth of her
 trade with the British West Indies, and one fortieth of her
 whole trade. Colombla and La Plata had ceased to pay any
 interest on their debt.
 This by no means proves that our recognition of them
 was a mistake, but it was no great matter for triumph.
 Mr. Fyffe has remarked: ' There ls indeed little doubt that
 the independence of the Spanish colonies would have been
 recognised by Great Britain soon after the war of 1823, who-
 ever might have been our Minister for Foreign ASairs; but
 this recognition was a different matter in the hands of
 Canning from what it would have been in the hands of his
 predecessor. The contrast between the two men was one of
 spirit rather than of avowed rules of action. Where Castle-
 reagh offered apologies to the Continental sovereigns, Canning
 uttered defiance.2
 The result of Canning's methods, alike in the Spanish
 and the Greek question, was to provoke sharp personal
 antagonism between him and Metternich. To the latter
 Canning was the ' scourge of the world,' a malevolent meteor
 hurled by Providence upon England and Europe.3 Canning
 in turn regarded Metternich as ' the greatest r and 1
 on the Continent, perhaps ln the civilised world.'4 These
 antipathies separated England from the ally with whom on
 the whole she had most interests in common, and served the
 purposes of Russia in her dealings with Turkey. Two of
 1 See chap. xi. of The CoZmbian and Venezehan RepgbZics, by \v. L.
 Scruggs (Igoo).
 2 Fyffe, hModern Europe, p. SI 7- 8 Metternich's Memoirs, iv. 324 and 392.
 3 Stapleton, George Caxning and his Si>7zes, p. 427.
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 Canning's adherents Palmerston and Stratford de RedcliiSe
 -laboured hard in later life to recover some of the ground
 which he had enabled Russia to gain. At home, the
 stimulus which he gave to liberalism hastened the advent of
 Reform, to which he was always opposed, and the break-up
 of the party to which he had always belonged.
 His wit, his eloquence, his high spirit, and his quick
 sympathy with public opinion made Canning a statesman of
 whom his countrymen are jllstly proud, but the qualities
 which make a successful leader of the House of Commons
 are not those which are most essential for a Minister of
 Foreign ASairs.
 APPENDIX
 The following extracts from unpublished letters throw light on the
 currents of opinion in England, and the mixture of motives in favour
 of the recognition of the Spanish-American States. They were
 written to a lady who was living at Bogoti, where she acted as agent
 for a London firm. She was the widow of an officer who had taken
 out a British legion to Venezuela in I8I9 (see ' Wellington Despatches,'
 third series, vol. ii. pp. II6-I26). The writers were Sir William
 Adams, a well-known oculist, who had thrown himself into American
 speculation, and Sir Robert Wilson, M.P. for Southwark, who was
 the ardent champion of liberty all over the world. He had gone
 to Spain in I823, to help the Spaniards in resisting the French
 * .
 ]nvaslon.
 Sir WiEEiam ildams to Affirs. EngZish
 September 8, I824 [In a previous letter] ' I recommended your
 advising the Executive securing to the Nation the produce of all
 Platina mines discovered in future (and an abundance may be found
 if looked after), as the Gold Mines found in Great Britain are secured
 to the Crown instance, the Gold Mines of Wicklow. Among other
 -reasons for this measure is the certainty that, in consequence of the
 enormous quantities of silver which will be imported into Europe
 when the Mexican and Peruvian mines are properly worked, that
 metal will cease to be a precious meta and it is my opinion as
 H 2
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 well as that of very competent judges equally as my own that in
 twenty years hence the Governments of Europe will be,obliged to alter-
 their metallic currency, and consequently, if so, Platina m?sZ be the
 substitute.
 ' I also requested you to secure the enclosed patents for tanning,
 which will be of immense importance to Columbia, as, from the
 quantities of Hides she produces, she will be enabled by tanning
 them herself to supply most of the other States. After securing the
 Patents I requested you to endeavour to sell them, and we would
 assign to you five per cent. of the net produce of the sale, but do
 not sell them without communicating first to us. I say we because
 I have a third part of the Patent, which I flatter myself will in noh
 degree check the natural energy of your mind and exertions in
 eSecting the most beneficial arrangement and sale. I will, as soon
 as I can, procure specimens and forward them to you, but in the
 interim it will be enough for you to guarantee that the article shall
 be perfecZ, that is, superior to anything ever seen in Columbia, and
 equal to the very best ever made in England, and vastly superior to
 that generally procured here at present. Within the last two months
 the Patent was sold in France for 40,000z., after the leather had
 undergone the strictest scrutiny of Chaptal and the first Chemists
 and Tanners in Paris. The Patentees (one of whom is Perkins mZ
 Partner) expect soo,oooZ. for their Patent in England. I think that
 you ought to sellitfor I20,000Z. in Columbia. Get the Government
 to purchase it and grant Licences to Tanners, whereby they would
 vastly increase the Revenue and add to the general prosperity of the
 nation.
 'I also requested you to obtain a Patent for Perkins's High
 Pressure Steam Engine and Rotatory Scull for propelling Steam-
 Boats in aX the waters agd seas of Cohgmbia. He is my Partner and
 I purchased one third of his Patents. You will perceive, by the
 inclosed Proofsheet of remarks which I have hastily thrown together,
 the nature of this invention. His system of Engine-propelling means
 and boat building altogether constitute the most perfect system that
 the world has ever seen or the human mind can imagine. He has.
 made contracts to build boats for the Ganges which will not dtraw
 above twelve or fourteen inches of water, therefore most peculiarly
 well adapted for the Columbian inland Rivers, especially the Magda-
 lena.... I reserve the last part of this letter for a subject in which
 I am, as by Lady Adams's letters you will find she also is, most
 interested, namely for you to exert your influence in inducing the
 Columbian Government to invest their loose money in Cockburn's
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 and Peel's Psank. Sir Robert Peel, the father of the Minister, has
 established a Bank br the benefit of his grandchildren7 to which
 belong the children of Dean Cockburnw His brothers, General Sir
 James C., Paynlaster of Marines, and Admiral Sir George C., one of
 the Lords of the Admiralty, are acting Partners. It is called the
 4 Government Bank " from the exertions made by the Government
 People to support it. Mr. Canning, out of compliment to his
 Colleague, the Minister Peel, keeps his money in this Bank. Now,
 they are all (especially the Cockburns) the warmest friends of South
 American Independerlce, arld are particularly anxious to cultivate
 relations and connection with the new States. It is needless for me
 to point out the immense advantages to Columbia in having such a
 connection as their Patrons and friends, for the Peels have decidedly
 the greatest influence of any single family in England. The
 Minister is the personal friend of the Duke of York, and will be
 Prime Minister when the King dies. And moreover look at the
 respectability of drawing upon the GovernmenZ Bank instead of a
 Jew, who is perfectly understood to be one both in heart and
 principle and who no doubt employs Columbian money at 4 per
 cent., and as he is a great Speculator in Foreign Loans (having the
 Columbian, Mexican, and Portuguese Loans, and having also been
 tampering with the Spaniards), if any Loan should go very wrong
 probably ag nis creditors (' would get in for it." Now no such
 fears couZd for a moment be entertained in Peel's Bank (half a
 million being S;r Robert's portion), while for their own interests'
 sake they will as a matter of course do all in their power to
 promote the views and objects of Columbia in every shape and
 form, and if they could execute commissions for artrls, clothing,
 Ac. of course they would do so on receiving a commission for their
 trouble. . . .'
 OcRober 2, I824.... 4 I have written to you twice about Cock-
 burnXs House for you to try to get the money of the Loan deposited
 in their hands, as well as the supply of arms, stores, &c. The
 benefit to South American interests generally will be greatly benefitted
 (sic) by such a connection, for it is human nature that those who
 profit by the prosperity of any nation or set of nations will do all in
 their power to promote that prosperity. Now that the Peels and
 Cockburns have that power is as obvious as the noonday, as also
 that Jews and merchants do not possess it} while their principle is to
 get aX Aey can out of their customers, and it is not considered a sin
 to make a rich cusZomer pay the higAest price for every article. Now
 in conversation with Sir James yesterday he declared that in any
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 supplies he might furnish he never would permit the inordinate
 profits to be put upon the articles which it was understood the new
 Governments have had hitherto to pay, and he said that he would
 feel himself conscientiously bound to procure the very best and most
 useful kinds of articles that this country could afford. Now this [is}
 the true patriotic spirit for the new States to deal with, and with
 what confidence and pleasure must they enter into correspondence
 with men who feel and act up to such principles ! As a proof of the
 sincerity of Sir James's disinterested friendship to South America
 (for he is aAmosG as great a zealot in the cause as your humble
 servant) he hesitated exceedingly in acquiescing in the Platina
 because he thought that it would not be beneficial to Columbia to
 introduce anything new which might bring upon her either the
 jealousy or disapprobation of older States. But when I explained
 that it was to liberate the gold and silver for exportation and to be
 confined to Columbia, he immediately gave it his warmest approba--
 tion, declaring that no benefit to the House should ever induce hirD
 to recommend a measure hostile to the interests of the New World.
 This is the right and proper feeling to be entertained by Capitalists
 in this country towards the new States, who have it fully in their power
 most liberally to repay those who exercise these feelings towards
 them.
 ' The inclosed speech of Lord Liverpool his Lordship read over
 and corrected in manuscript at my instance, while the Marquis!
 of Lansdowne almost wrote his over entirely after the shorthand-
 writer had taken it in full. I was fully employed for a fortnight in
 obtaining data for his Lordship, giving him all my manuscript
 reports, &c.... We are most anxiously waiting for [news of}
 Bolivar. Upon his exertions depends the decision of Ministers to
 act immediately. Iturbide being dead, the expulsion of the-
 Spaniards from Peru is all that is further required by the Chancellor
 and his party in the Cabinet to recognise the new States.'
 Februarzy I5, I826 [after announcing the failure of Mr. B. Ae
 Goldsmidt]. ' You recollect, my dear Madam, what I wrote to you
 respecting Cockburn's Bank this time twelve months. Refer to my
 letters and see what I then anticipated as being possible to happen,
 and how much the Colombian Government have to regret not acting
 upon the suggestion. As may well be supposed, the consternation
 in the Foreign market is exZreme. The Colombian 6 per cent. stock
 is at 36 or 38 Mexican at 42. It is furthermore stated that the
 whole of the Colombian money left for dividends, &c. was in Gold-
 smidt's hands, so that there will be nothing left to pa) the half-yearly
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 dividends. Consols are at 73, and are expected to go down still
 lower. In fact such distress, misery, and confusion now existing in
 the City was scarcely ever before witnessed.'
 Sir Robert WiEson to Mrs. EngZish
 Jz4ne 5, J824 . . . s Columbia seems to be quite at peace, but I
 hope she will avoid the dangers of security. Whilst there is a
 Spanish or Portuguese flag on the Main, whilst Mexico is unsettled,
 whilst the Havannah and Porto Rico are Ingfuisition stations, she
 must keep armed. The recognition of Independence by England, and
 her subsequent treaties, will be determined very much by the power
 of Columbia to maintain it. Force, not weakness, is the bond of
 union between States. I am sure Canning is quite sincere in his
 wish to cultivate a good understanding with a free S. America,
 and resolution to protect the Western Hemisphere from the vows and
 machinations of the Holy Alliance.
 'The Brazils is the only part respecting which I feel uneasy.
 Who can have confidence in the existing state of things? But
 perhaps some permanent arrangement may be made under the
 auspices of England. Spain is in a wretched state. Portugal has
 just been menaced with a Tyger government. The young savage is,
 however, exiled; but what a wretched scene does Portugal present
 and what a sorry prospect ! These misfortunes might have all been
 prevented if France and the Holies had been restrained in their
 wicked enterprize, but the Castlereagh system was still too much in
 force, and Canning not sufficiently in the saddle to check the Court.
 He is now in greater strength, and I have no doubt will be prime
 minister very soon, for Lord Liverpool's health is too bad for much
 longer attention to business.'
 October 9, I824 . . . s I trust the moment is now arrived when
 the recognition of Columbia will crown General Bolivar's glory, for
 that recognition is the seal of S. A. Independencew The struggle in
 Peru has been full of anxiety, but it has greatly added to the
 Liberador's reputation as a general and a statesman. S. A. has now
 nothing to fear from an invading force of Spain or the H. A. Let
 her only guard against internal innovations and Papal fetters of the
 mind. The Theocracy is the great power which both worlds have to
 fear most, but, as I have written to Belford,l its energies are on the
 continent making immense efforts with the hope of extending its re-
 cuperations to the former colonies of Spain and then anatomising
 ' His son, aide-deZcamp to Bolivar.
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 the system of eivil and religious Liberty so happily establishing here.
 Spain is in a more fearful state of anarchy than ever, but eannot
 remain long in sueh a state without the intervention of England,
 either to insist on a eonstitutional mareh of the Government under
 favor of Freneh garrisons for a given period, or on the evaeuation of
 Spain to give the Spaniards the opportunity of settling their own
 differenees, which will be very soon done by the expulsion ot
 Ferdinand and the Apostoliek Junta. I suspeet the last measure
 will be the one adopted, so that Russia may have no pretext to send
 her contingent in eopartnership with France, which is the great
 objeet of Russia
 ' Franee seems quiet and pleased with Charles X., who has graeious
 manners, but Franee is so politieally an abjeet eounty that there is
 no aseertaining a real state of feeling. The Continent is quiet under
 Alexander's rod, and Greeee, under the most extraordinary eireum
 stanees that seemed to render her sueeess impossible, has all bul
 established her freedom. Here again I believe Canning's poliey has
 diseomfited the Russian autoerat's intention, and repaired in great
 measure the wrongs done under the Diplomaey of his Predeeessor.
 He is eertainly the most popular man now in Europe, and what adds
 to his Honor is his proseription by the H. A. as the Chef des Jaeobins.
 It is the pet term of all the Inquisitors' agents when his name is
 mentioned. Nothing has more eonvineed me that he is a British
 minister in every sense of the word....'
 March 27, I825.... 'You will have seen that I have under-
 taken the duty of a Direetor of the Columbian Assoeiation. I did
 so more for the ambition of rendering serviee than deriving benefit,
 but I have now also reason to think the eonnexion will be advan-
 tageous as an investment.l . . . I eonsider England must be henee-
 forth the advaneed fortress of South Ameriea. Continental eon-
 nexions will only be seeondary to that Policy. The national judgment
 is in unequivoeal unison with this new allianee, and all our thoughts
 and energies are fixed upon sueh operating in favour of the New
 World. Our enemies in Europe may say "that our liberality is
 selfish." Be it so in some respeets, but that selfishness is the best
 seeurity for the foundation and preservation of our relations. With
 the high feeling generated by eonquest, the Patriotism and Power of
 Free Institutions, Steam and British Capital, South Ameriea advanees
 to her maturity with hitherto unparalleled speed and solidity of
 ' On September 24, I827, he wrote:-'Our C. A. Association has failed
 entirely, leaving me a loser of I,2501., and many of the Directors several
 thousands. '
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 growth. Canning has been in this instance the most fortunate, and
 truly, considering the adverse spirit he had to encounter in certain
 quarters, the most deserving of our statesmen. Russia grumbles,
 France intrigues, Spain writhes, but I do not expect war to be
 immediate. The governments know that they are at war with Zheir
 peopZe, and that their existence depends upon our fiat. The India
 news keeps up their spirits a little, and they flatter themselves
 Ireland will be an auxiliary, but I have no apprehensions that they
 will be able to profit by either Loztery. We have great means to
 deploy when pressed, and we can by conciliation secllre Ireland at
 eany time. It is much to be hoped the moment is arrived.
 ' I have no positive direct advices from the Brazils, but I hear
 from very good sources Don Pedro is playing the autocrat and Fool.
 I consider that establishment as one of Passage, and the sooner it is
 a matter of past history the better, for the Holy Allies will have a
 friend and agent the less. Whilst anything is to be done new States
 like Columbia and her sisterhood must consider nothing is done, and
 therefore I hope they will not yet sing Te Deum, and disband and
 sleep. France is in Spain, and Spain has Porto Rico and the
 Havannah open to receive Frenchmen ! There must be a new
 edisposition of these offensive points before the hour of repose can be
 permitted. I say nothing of Chiloe and St. Jean d'Ulloa, for I
 conceive they of course engage full attention, and will be occupied
 without pause. Spain still flatters herself she may establish her
 Princes in the New World, but her financial distress will almost oblige
 her to barter crowns and pretensions for dollars. Those, however,
 she will never get over till the French are clear of the Peninsula, and
 till the Cortes loans are recognised, for what Treaty can be valid
 -when such a monstrous breach of faith is maintained ? England is
 prospering to the greatest degree, not only in her commerce, trade,
 agriculture, and every branch of Revenue, but in her credit abroad
 and liberty of system at home. It is a complete reform, and
 Philosophy and Liberty are in full career of action.'
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